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This paper studies the strategic interaction between a bank
whose deposits are randomly withdrawn and a lender of last
resort (LLR) that bases its decision on supervisory informa-
tion on the quality of the bank’s assets. The bank is subject
to a capital requirement and chooses the liquidity buﬀer that
it wants to hold and the risk of its loan portfolio. The equi-
librium choice of risk is shown to be decreasing in the capital
requirement and increasing in the interest rate charged by the
LLR. Moreover, when the LLR does not charge penalty rates,
the bank chooses the same level of risk and a smaller liquidity
buﬀer than in the absence of an LLR. Thus, in contrast with
the general view, the existence of an LLR does not increase
the incentives to take risk, while penalty rates do.
JEL Codes: E58, G21, G28.
From their inception, central banks have assumed as one of their
key responsibilities the provision of liquidity to banks unable to ﬁnd
it elsewhere. The classical doctrine on the lender of last resort (LLR)
was put forward by Bagehot (1873, 96–7): “Nothing, therefore, can
be more certain than that the Bank of England . . . must in time
of panic do what all other similar banks must do. . . . And for this
purpose there are two rules: First. That these loans should only be
made at a very high rate of interest. . . . Secondly. That at this
rate these advances should be made on all good banking securities,
and as largely as the public ask for them.” The contemporary lit-
erature on the LLR has disagreed on whether the aim of “staying
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the panic” may be achieved by open market operations (see, for ex-
ample, Goodfriend and King [1988] or Kaufman [1991]) or whether
it requires lending to individual banks (see, for example, Flannery
[1996] or Goodhart [1999]).1 However, both sides seem to agree on
the proposition that such lending creates a moral hazard problem.
As argued by Solow (1982, 242): “The existence of a credible LLR
must reduce the private cost of risk taking. It can hardly be doubted
that, in consequence, more risk will be taken.”
The purpose of this paper is to show that this proposition is not
generally true. Speciﬁcally, we model the strategic interaction be-
tween a bank and an LLR. The bank is funded with insured deposits
and equity capital, is subject to a minimum capital requirement,
and can invest in two assets: a safe and perfectly liquid asset, and a
risky and illiquid asset, whose risk is privately chosen by the bank.
Deposits are randomly withdrawn. If the withdrawal is larger than
the funds invested in the safe asset (the liquidity buﬀer), the bank
will be forced into liquidation unless it can secure emergency lending
from the LLR. In this setting, we show that when the LLR does not
charge penalty rates, the bank chooses the same level of risk and a
smaller liquidity buﬀer than in the absence of an LLR. Moreover,
the equilibrium choice of risk is increasing in the penalty rate.
To explain the basic intuition for these results, consider a setup
in which a risk-neutral bank raises a unit of insured deposits at an
interest rate that is normalized to zero, and invests all these funds in
an illiquid asset that yields a gross return R1 = R(p) with probability
p, and R0 = 0 otherwise. Moreover, suppose that p is chosen by the
bank at the time of investment, and that the success return R(p) is
decreasing in p, so safer investments yield a lower success return.
Without deposit withdrawals, and hence without the need for
an LLR, with probability p the bank gets the return R(p) of its
investment in the risky asset minus the amount due to the depositors,
that is, R(p) − 1, and with probability 1 − p the bank fails. Under
limited liability, the bank then maximizes p[R(p) − 1], which gives
p∗ = argmax p[R(p)− 1].
Suppose now that a certain fraction of the deposits are with-
drawn, and that there is an LLR that only provides the required
1All these references (and more) are usefully collected in Goodhart and Illing
(2002).
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funding if its supervisory information on the quality of the bank’s
asset is good. Speciﬁcally, let s1 denote the good supervisory signal,
and let q = Pr(s1 | R1) denote the quality of the supervisory infor-
mation. If the LLR only charges the zero deposit rate, the bank will
get R(p)− 1 with probability Pr(s1, R1) = Pr(s1 | R1) Pr(R1) = qp.
Since the constant q factors out of the maximization problem, we
get the same p∗ = argmax p[R(p) − 1]. Hence we conclude that the
introduction of deposit withdrawals and an LLR does not aﬀect the
bank’s incentives to take risk.
As for the result on penalty rates, the intuition is that they in-
crease the expected interest payments in the high-return state and,
consequently, push the bank toward choosing higher risk and higher
return strategies (i.e., a lower p). This positive relationship between
the bank’s (expected) funding costs and its portfolio risk is not new,
since it is a simple implication of the analysis in the classical paper
on credit rationing of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In particular, they
show (p. 393) how “higher interest rates induce ﬁrms to undertake
projects with lower probabilities of success but higher payoﬀs when
successful.” Applying the same argument to banks instead of ﬁrms
gives the key result.
To endogenize the decision of the LLR, we adopt a political econ-
omy perspective according to which government agencies have ob-
jectives that need not correspond with the maximization of social
welfare. In particular, following Repullo (2000) and Kahn and San-
tos (2001), we assume that the LLR cares about (1) the revenues and
costs associated with its lending activity and (2) whether the bank
fails. This may be justiﬁed by relating the payoﬀ of the oﬃcials in
charge of LLR decisions with the surpluses or deﬁcits of the agency,
as well as with the possible reputation costs associated with a bank
failure.
Specifying an objective function for the LLR would not be needed
if the supervisory information were veriﬁable, because then the in-
tervention rule could be speciﬁed ex-ante, possibly in order to imple-
ment a socially optimal decision. However, the information coming
from bank examinations is likely to contain many subjective ele-
ments that are diﬃcult to describe ex-ante, so it seems reasonable to
assume that it is nonveriﬁable. In this case, the decision will have to
be delegated to the LLR, which will simply compare its conditional
expected payoﬀ of supporting and not supporting the bank.
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To facilitate the presentation, the analysis starts with a basic
model in which the bank is fully funded with deposits and can only
invest in the risky asset. Then the model is extended to the case
where the bank can invest in a safe and perfectly liquid asset and
can raise equity capital. In the general model, we also assume that
the bank is subject to a minimum capital requirement, and that (in
line with Basel bank capital regulation) investment in the safe asset
does not carry a capital charge.
We characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game between the
bank and the LLR, where the former chooses the level of risk (and,
in the general model, its capital and liquidity buﬀer) and the lat-
ter its contingent lending policy. The LLR’s equilibrium strategy is
straightforward: it will support the bank if and only if the liquidity
shortfall is smaller than or equal to a critical value that is decreasing
in the ex-post (i.e., conditional on the supervisory signal) probability
of bank failure. The bank’s equilibrium strategy is, however, more
diﬃcult to characterize. The reason is that its objective function is
likely to be convex in the capital decision, which leads to a corner
solution where the bank’s capital is equal to the minimum required
by regulation. In this case, the equilibrium level of risk only depends
on the capital requirement, with higher capital increasing the bank
shareholders’ losses in case of default and reducing their incentives
for risk taking. We complete the analysis by deriving numerically,
for a simple parameterization of the model, the bank’s equilibrium
liquidity. We show that in equilibrium, the bank chooses the same
level of risk of its illiquid portfolio and a lower liquidity buﬀer than
in the absence of an LLR.
Four extensions are then discussed. First, we derive the result
that penalty rates increase the equilibrium choice of risk. Next,
we examine the second of Bagehot’s rules—namely, that last-resort
lending be collateralized—and show that this protection translates
into a lower liquidity buﬀer and therefore a higher probability that
the bank will require emergency liquidity assistance, but without
any eﬀect on risk taking. Third, we consider the eﬀects of intro-
ducing a higher discount rate for the LLR, which yields a forbear-
ance result: in equilibrium, the bank is more likely to receive sup-
port from the LLR, and hence it will hold a lower liquidity buﬀer.
Finally, we look at the case where the LLR shares a fraction of
the deposit insurance payouts (which includes, in the limit, the
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case where the LLR is the deposit insurer) and show that in this
case the LLR’s decision becomes more sensitive to the supervisory
information.
It is important to stress that the key result on the zero eﬀect on
risk taking of having an LLR crucially depends on the speciﬁcation
of the order of moves, in particular the fact that the bank cannot
modify the level of risk after receiving the support of the LLR (or
cannot borrow from the LLR to undertake new investments). But
in such a situation, the LLR is likely to carefully monitor the bank,
preventing it from engaging in any signiﬁcant risk shifting, so this
seems a reasonable assumption.
Although the literature on the LLR is extensive (see Freixas et
al. [2000] for a recent survey), somewhat surprisingly there has been
little formal modeling of the issues discussed in this paper. Most of
the relevant papers invoke general results on the link between any
form of insurance and moral hazard. Moreover, liquidity support is
not always distinguished from capital support, which clearly has bad
incentive eﬀects whenever it translates into rescuing the shareholders
of a distressed bank. This paper restricts attention to liquidity sup-
port based on supervisory information on the quality of the bank’s
assets, and shows that under fairly general conditions this support
does not encourage risk taking.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the basic
model of the game between the bank and the LLR. Section 2 intro-
duces equity capital and a minimum capital requirement, and allows
the bank to invest in a safe asset, characterizing the equilibrium with
and without an LLR and discussing its comparative statics proper-
ties. Section 3 analyzes the eﬀects of Bagehot’s rules of charging
penalty rates and requiring collateral, as well as changing the ob-
jective function of the LLR to allow for higher discounting of future
payouts and sharing deposit insurance payouts. Section 4 oﬀers some
concluding remarks.
1. The Basic Model
Consider an economy with three dates (t = 0, 1, 2) and two risk-
neutral agents: a bank and a lender of last resort (LLR). At date
0 the bank raises one unit of deposits at an interest rate that is
normalized to zero, and invests these funds in an asset that yields
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a random return R at date 2. The probability distribution of R is
described by
R =

R0,
R1,
with probability 1− p,
with probability p,
(1)
where p ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter chosen by the bank at date 0. We
assume that R0 < 1 < R1, so 1 − p measures the riskiness of the
bank’s portfolio. The risky asset is illiquid in that there is no sec-
ondary market where it can be traded at date 1. However, the asset
can be fully liquidated at this date, which yields a liquidation value
L ∈ (0, 1).2 Deposits are fully insured and can be withdrawn at ei-
ther date 1 or date 2. To simplify the presentation, deposit insurance
premia are set equal to zero.
At date 1 a fraction v ∈ [0, 1] of the deposits are withdrawn.
Since the bank’s asset is illiquid, if v > 0 the bank faces a liquidity
problem that can only be solved by borrowing from the LLR. If such
funding is not provided, the bank is liquidated at date 1. Otherwise,
the bank stays open until the ﬁnal date 2. The liquidity shock v is
observable, and we initially suppose that the LLR only charges the
deposit rate, which has been normalized to zero.
In order to decide whether to provide this emergency funding,
the LLR supervises the bank, which yields a signal s ∈ {s0, s1}
on the return of the bank’s risky asset. Signal s is assumed to be
nonveriﬁable, so the LLR’s decision rule cannot be designed ex-ante,
but will be chosen ex-post by the LLR in order to maximize an
objective function that will be speciﬁed below.
We introduce the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. R0 = 0 and R1 = R(p), where R(p) is decreasing
and concave, with R(1) ≥ 1 and R(1) + R′(1) < 0.
Assumption 2. Pr(s0 | R0) = Pr(s1 | R1) = q ∈ [12 , 1].
Assumption 1, together with (1), implies that the expected ﬁnal
return of the risky asset, E(R) = pR(p), reaches a maximum at
p̂ ∈ (0, 1), which is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
R(p̂) + p̂R′(p̂) = 0. (2)
2The liquidation value L could be correlated with the ﬁnal return R, but this
would not change the results.
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To see this, notice that the ﬁrst derivative of pR(p) with respect to
p equals R(0) > 0 for p = 0 and R(1) + R′(1) < 0 for p = 1, and
the second derivative satisﬁes 2R′(p) + pR′′(p) < 0. Thus, increases
in p below (above) p̂ increase (decrease) the expected ﬁnal return of
the risky asset. Moreover, we have p̂R(p̂) > R(1) ≥ 1. Assumption
1 is borrowed from Allen and Gale (2000, chap. 8) and allows us to
analyze in a continuous manner the risk-shifting eﬀects of diﬀerent
institutional settings.3
Assumption 2 introduces a parameter q that describes the qual-
ity of the supervisory information.4 This information is only about
whether the ﬁnal return of the risky asset will be low (R0) or high
(R1), and not about the particular value R(p) taken by the high
return. By Bayes’ law, it is immediate to show that
Pr(R1 | s0) = p(1− q)
p(1− q) + (1− p)q , (3)
and
Pr(R1 | s1) = pq
pq + (1− p)(1− q) . (4)
Hence when q = 12 we have Pr(R1 | s0) = Pr(R1 | s1) = p, so
the supervisory signal is uninformative, while when q = 1 we have
Pr(R1 | s0) = 0 and Pr(R1 | s1) = 1, so the signal completely reveals
whether the ﬁnal return will be low or high. Since Pr(R1 | s0) < p <
Pr(R1 | s1) for p < 1 and q > 12 , s0 and s1 will be called the bad and
the good signal, respectively.
From the point of view of the initial date 0, the deposit with-
drawal v is a continuous random variable with support [0, 1] and
cumulative distribution function F (v).5 Since deposits are fully in-
sured, it is natural to assume that the withdrawal v is independent
of the ﬁnal return R. Also, v is assumed to be independent of the
supervisory signal s.
The bank and the LLR play a sequential game in which the bank
chooses at date 0 the riskiness of its portfolio p, and if v > 0, the LLR
3This assumption has also been used by Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (2003) and
Repullo (2005).
4More generally, we could have Pr(s0 | R0) = Pr(s1 | R1), but this would not
change the results.
5The distribution function F (v) could have a mass point at v = 0, in which
case F (0) > 0 would be the probability that the bank does not suﬀer a liquidity
shock at date 1.
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decides at date 1 whether to support the bank based on two pieces
of information: the size of the liquidity shock v, and the supervisory
signal s. Importantly, the LLR does not observe the bank’s choice of
p, so we have a game of complete but imperfect information.
In this game, the LLR is assumed to care about the expected
value of its ﬁnal wealth net of a share α of the social cost c incurred
in the event of a bank failure. Such cost comprises the administra-
tive costs of closing the bank and paying back depositors and the
negative externalities associated with the failure (contagion to other
banks, breakup of lending relationships, distortions in the monetary
transmission mechanism, etc.). As noted above, the LLR’s objective
function may be justiﬁed by relating the payoﬀ of the oﬃcials in
charge of its decisions with the income generated or lost through its
lending activity and the social cost associated with a bank failure.
To simplify the presentation, we assume that α = 1, so the LLR fully
internalizes the social cost of bank failure.6
Consider a situation in which v > 0, and let s be the signal
observed by the LLR. The payoﬀ of the LLR if it supports the bank
is computed as follows. With probability Pr(R1 | s) the bank will
be solvent at date 2 and the LLR will recover its loan v, while with
probability Pr(R0 | s) the bank will fail and the LLR will lose v and
incur the cost c, so the LLR’s expected payoﬀ is −(v + c) Pr(R0 | s).
On the other hand, if the LLR does not provide the liquidity support,
the bank will be liquidated at date 1, and the LLR’s payoﬀ will be
−c. Hence the LLR will support the bank if
−(v + c) Pr(R0 | s) ≥ −c.
Using the fact that Pr(R1 | s) = 1 − Pr(R0 | s), this condition
simpliﬁes to
v ≤ cPr(R1 | s)
Pr(R0 | s) .
Substituting (3) and (4) into this expression, it follows that when
the LLR observes the bad signal s0, it will support the bank if
v ≤ v0 ≡ cp(1− q)(1− p)q , (5)
6Clearly, this assumption does not aﬀect the characterization of the equilib-
rium of the game, since it is equivalent to a change in the cost c. Interestingly,
Repullo (2000) assumes α < 1, while Kahn and Santos (2001) assume α > 1.
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and when the LLR observes the good signal s1, it will support the
bank if
v ≤ v1 ≡ cpq(1− p)(1− q) . (6)
The critical values v0 and v1 deﬁned in (5) and (6) satisfy
v1 =
(
q
1− q
)2
v0,
which implies v1 > v0 whenever q > 12 . Hence if the signal is infor-
mative, the LLR is more likely to provide support to the bank when
it observes the good signal s1 than when it observes the bad signal
s0. Moreover, the critical value v0 is decreasing in the quality q of the
supervisory information, with limq→1 v0 = 0, and the critical value
v1 is increasing in q, with limq→1 v1 = ∞.7 Thus, when the signal is
perfectly informative, the bank will never be supported if the signal
is bad, and will always be supported if it is good.
The critical values v0 and v1 are increasing in the social cost of
bank failure c, because when this cost is high, the LLR has a stronger
incentive to lend to the bank in order to save c when the high return
R1 obtains. They are also increasing in p = Pr(R1), because when
this probability is high, the LLR is more likely to recover its loan v
and save the cost c.
By limited liability, the bank gets a zero payoﬀ if it is liquidated
at date 1 or fails at date 2, and gets R(p) − 1 if it succeeds at date
2. This event happens when the high return R1 obtains and either
the LLR observes the bad signal s0 and the liquidity shock satisﬁes
v ≤ v0, or it observes the good signal s1 and the liquidity shock
satisﬁes v ≤ v1. By assumption 2 and the independence of v we have
Pr(R1, s0, and v ≤ v0) = Pr(R1) Pr(s0 | R1) Pr(v ≤ v0)
= p(1− q)F (v0),
Pr(R1, s1, and v ≤ v1) = Pr(R1) Pr(s1 | R1) Pr(v ≤ v1)
= pqF (v1).
Hence, the bank’s objective function is
UB = p[(1− q)F (v0) + qF (v1)][R(p)− 1]. (7)
7The fact that v1 may be greater than one is not a problem, because since the
support of v is [0, 1], we have Pr(v ≤ v1) = F (v1) = 1, so in this case the bank
would be supported with probability one.
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A Nash equilibrium of the game between the bank and the LLR
is a choice of risk p∗ by the bank, and a choice of maximum liquidity
support by the LLR contingent on the bad and the good signal, v∗0
and v∗1, such that p∗ maximizes
p[(1− q)F (v∗0) + qF (v∗1)][R(p)− 1],
and
v∗0 =
cp∗(1− q)
(1− p∗)q and v
∗
1 =
cp∗q
(1− p∗)(1− q) .
In this deﬁnition, it is important to realize that since the LLR
does not observe the bank’s choice of risk, the critical values v∗0 and
v∗1 only depend on the equilibrium p∗. This in turn implies that
the term [(1− q)F (v∗0) + qF (v∗1)] factors out in the bank’s objective
function, so its problem reduces to maximize p[R(p)− 1].8
The ﬁrst-order condition that characterizes the equilibrium
choice of risk p∗ is
R(p∗) + p∗R′(p∗) = 1. (8)
Since, by assumption 1, R(p) + pR′(p) is decreasing in p, conditions
(2) and (8) imply that p∗ is strictly below the ﬁrst-best p̂, so the bank
will be choosing too much risk. This is just the standard risk-shifting
eﬀect that follows from debt ﬁnancing under limited liability.
It should be noted that the bank’s choice of p changes the proba-
bility distribution of the signals, increasing Pr(s1) = pq+(1−p)(1−q)
and decreasing Pr(s0) = 1− Pr(s1) (as long as q > 12). However, by
assumption 2, p does not aﬀect the distribution of the signals con-
ditional on the realization of the high return R1, which implies that
the bank’s probability of getting R(p)− 1 is linear in p = Pr(R1).
To sum up, we have set up a model of a bank and an LLR in which
the former chooses the riskiness of its portfolio and the latter chooses
whether to lend to the bank to cover random deposit withdrawals,
a decision that depends on a signal on the ex-post quality of the
portfolio. We have shown that the bank’s equilibrium choice of risk is
independent of the distribution of the liquidity shocks and the other
parameters that determine the LLR’s decision, such as the quality
of the supervisory information or the social cost of bank failure.
8In a sequential game of complete information, the characterization of equi-
librium would be more complicated, since the critical values v∗0 and v
∗
1 would
depend on the bank’s choice of p.
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2. The General Model
We now introduce in our basic model two features of banking in the
real world that are relevant to the problem under discussion. First,
on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet, we suppose that, apart
from the risky asset, the bank can invest in a safe and perfectly liquid
asset that can be used as a buﬀer against liquidity shocks. Second,
on the liability side, we suppose that the bank can be funded with
both deposits and equity capital, and that the bank is subject to a
minimum capital requirement. The LLR observes both the bank’s
equity capital and its investment in the liquid asset. We characterize
the equilibrium of the new game between the bank and the LLR,
compare it with that of a model without an LLR, and examine its
comparative statics properties.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that at date 0 the bank raises k equity cap-
ital and 1 − k deposits, and invests λ in the safe asset and 1 − λ
in the risky asset, so the size of its balance sheet is normalized to
one.9 Bank capital has to satisfy the constraint k ≥ κ(1− λ), where
κ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the capital requirement depends on the (observable)
bank’s investment in the risky asset, but not on the (unobservable)
bank’s choice of risk.
We assume that the return of the safe asset is equal to the deposit
rate, which has been normalized to zero, and that bank capital is
provided by a special class of agents, called bankers, who require an
expected rate of return δ ≥ 0 on their investment. A strictly positive
value of δ captures either the scarcity of bankers’ wealth or, perhaps
more realistically, the existence of a premium for the agency and
asymmetric information problems faced by the bank shareholders.10
2.1 Characterization of Equilibrium
At date 1 a fraction v ∈ [0, 1] of the deposits are withdrawn. Since
the bank has 1 − k deposits, then v(1 − k) deposits are withdrawn
9This assumption is made without loss of generality. The same results would
obtain if, for example, the bank raised one unit of deposits and k units of capital,
and invested λ in the safe asset and 1 + k − λ in the risky asset.
10See Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997) and Diamond and Rajan (2000) for explicit
models of why δ might be positive. The same assumption is made by Bolton and
Freixas (2000), Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), and Repullo and Suarez
(2004), among others.
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at this date. There are two cases to consider. First, if v(1− k) ≤ λ,
the bank can repay the depositors by selling the required amount of
the safe asset, so it keeps λ− v(1− k) invested in the safe asset. In
this case the bank’s payoﬀ in the high-return state equals the return
of its investment in the safe asset, λ− v(1−k), plus the return of its
investment in the risky asset, (1 − λ)R(p), minus the amount paid
to the remaining depositors, (1− v)(1− k), that is,
λ− v(1− k) + (1− λ)R(p)− (1− v)(1− k) = (1− λ)[R(p)− 1] + k.
Second, if v(1− k) > λ, the bank needs to borrow v(1− k)− λ from
the LLR in order to avoid liquidation. If such funding is obtained,
the bank’s payoﬀ in the high-return state equals the return of its
investment in the risky asset, (1 − λ)R(p), minus the amount paid
to the remaining depositors, (1− v)(1− k), minus the amount paid
to the LLR, v(1− k)− λ, that is,
(1− λ)R(p)− (1− v)(1− k)− [v(1− k)− λ] = (1− λ)[R(p)− 1] + k.
In both cases, if the low-return state obtains, the bank’s net worth is
λ− (1− k), which will be negative as long as the bank’s investment
in the liquid asset, λ, does not exceed its deposits, 1 − k, which
will generally obtain in equilibrium.11 Hence, by limited liability,
the bank’s payoﬀ in the low-return state will be zero. Obviously, its
payoﬀ will also be zero when v(1 − k) > λ and the LLR does not
support the bank.
The decision of the LLR in the case in which the bank requires
emergency lending, v(1 − k) > λ, is characterized as follows. If the
LLR observes signal s and decides to support the bank, with prob-
ability Pr(R1 | s) the bank will be solvent at date 2 and the LLR
will recover its loan v(1 − k) − λ, while with probability Pr(R0 | s)
the bank will fail and the LLR will lose v(1 − k) − λ and incur the
cost c. If, on the other hand, the LLR does not provide the liquidity
support, the bank will be liquidated at date 1, and the LLR’s payoﬀ
will be −c. Hence the LLR will support the bank if
−[v(1− k)− λ + c] Pr(R0 | s) ≥ −c.
11In particular, we show below that under plausible conditions the capital
requirement will be binding, so k = κ(1 − λ), which implies λ − (1 − k) =
−(1− κ)(1− λ) < 0.
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As before, substituting (3) and (4) into this expression, it follows
that when the LLR observes the bad signal s0, it will support the
bank if the liquidity shortfall, v(1− k)− λ, is smaller than or equal
to the critical value v0 given by (5), that is, if
v ≤ v0 + λ
1− k , (9)
and when it observes the good signal s1, it will support the bank if
the liquidity shortfall, v(1 − k) − λ, is smaller than or equal to the
critical value v1 given by (6), that is, if
v ≤ v1 + λ
1− k . (10)
Thus, the probability that the bank will reach the ﬁnal date 2 is
increasing in its investment in the safe asset λ and its equity capital
k. This is explained by the role of the safe asset as a buﬀer against
liquidity shocks, and by the fact that the higher the bank capital,
the lower its deposits and hence the size of the liquidity shocks.
The bank’s objective function is to maximize the expected value
of the shareholders’ payoﬀ net of the opportunity cost of their initial
infusion of capital. The latter is simply (1 + δ)k. To compute the
former, notice that bank shareholders get a zero payoﬀ if the bank is
liquidated at date 1 or fails at date 2, and they get (1−λ)(R(p)−1)+k
if it succeeds at date 2. This event happens when the high return
R1 obtains and either the LLR observes the bad signal s0 and the
liquidity shock v satisﬁes (9), or it observes the good signal s1 and
the liquidity shock v satisﬁes (10). As before, we have
Pr
(
R1, s0, and v ≤ v0 + λ1− k
)
= p(1− q)F
(
v0 + λ
1− k
)
,
Pr
(
R1, s1, and v ≤ v1 + λ1− k
)
= pqF
(
v1 + λ
1− k
)
.
Hence, the bank’s objective function in the general model is
UB = p
[
(1− q)F
(
v0 + λ
1− k
)
+ qF
(
v1 + λ
1− k
)]
× [(1− λ)(R(p)− 1) + k]− (1 + δ)k. (11)
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Obviously, UB coincides with the objective function (7) in the pre-
vious section when λ = 0 and k = 0.
A Nash equilibrium of the game between the bank and the LLR
is a choice of liquidity λ∗, capital k∗, and risk p∗ by the bank, and a
choice of maximum liquidity support by the LLR contingent on the
bad and the good signal, v∗0 and v∗1, such that (λ
∗, k∗, p∗) maximizes
p
[
(1− q)F
(
v∗0 + λ
1− k
)
+ qF
(
v∗1 + λ
1− k
)]
× [(1− λ)(R(p)− 1) + k]− (1 + δ)k, (12)
subject to the capital requirement k ≥ κ(1− λ), and
v∗0 =
cp∗(1− q)
(1− p∗)q and v
∗
1 =
cp∗q
(1− p∗)(1− q) . (13)
As in the basic model, it is important to note that since the LLR
does not observe the bank’s choice of risk, the critical values v∗0 and
v∗1 only depend on the equilibrium p∗. This in turn implies that the
bank’s problem reduces to maximize p [(1− λ)(R(p)− 1) + k] . Thus,
the bank’s choice of risk is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
(1− λ∗)[R(p∗)− 1] + k∗ + p∗(1− λ∗)R′(p∗) = 0,
which simpliﬁes to
R(p∗) + p∗R′(p∗) = 1− k
∗
1− λ∗ . (14)
Comparing this expression with (2) and (8), and taking into account
that, by assumption 1, R(p) + pR′(p) is decreasing in p, it follows
that the bank’s equilibrium choice of risk p∗ will be closer to the ﬁrst-
best p̂ than in the model without the capital requirement. This is
just the standard capital-at-risk eﬀect : higher capital implies higher
losses for the bank’s shareholders in case of default and hence lower
incentives for risk taking.12
If the bank’s equilibrium choice of capital k∗ is at the corner
κ(1− λ∗), then the ﬁrst-order condition (14) further simpliﬁes to
R(p∗) + p∗R′(p∗) = 1− κ. (15)
12See Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) and Repullo (2004) for a recent
discussion of this eﬀect.
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In this case, the equilibrium p∗ only depends on the capital require-
ment κ. Moreover, assumption 1 implies that R(p) + pR′(p) is de-
creasing in p, which gives dp∗/dκ > 0. Hence, the higher the capital
requirement, the lower the risk chosen by the bank.13
In general, it is diﬃcult to prove that this corner solution will
obtain, since the properties of the bank’s objective function (12)
depend on the shape of the distribution function of the liquidity
shock F (v).14 For this reason, in what follows we work with a speciﬁc
parameterization of F (v), namely F (v) = vη, where η ∈ (0, 1).15 In
this case it can be checked that the bank’s objective function (12) is
convex in k, so we can only have either k∗ = κ(1 − λ∗) or k∗ = 1.
But for large k we have
F
(
v∗0 + λ
1− k
)
= F
(
v∗1 + λ
1− k
)
= 1,
so the derivative of (12) with respect to k is p− (1 + δ) < 0. Hence
k = 1 cannot be a solution, which gives k∗ = κ(1− λ∗).
This result implies that the equilibrium of the game between the
bank and the LLR is easy to characterize. The risk p∗ chosen by the
bank is the unique solution of the ﬁrst-order condition (15). This
in turn determines the critical values v∗0 and v∗1 that characterize
the behavior of the LLR. Substituting p = p∗ and F (v) = vη into
the bank’s objective function (12), we then ﬁnd the value of λ∗ by
maximizing
p∗
[
(1− q)
(
v∗0 + λ
1− k
)η
+ q
(
v∗1 + λ
1− k
)η]
× [(1− λ)(R(p∗)− 1) + k]− (1 + δ)k, (16)
subject to k = κ(1− λ). Finally, we get k∗ = κ(1− λ∗).
13Notice that for κ = 1, that is, a 100% capital requirement, (2) and (15) imply
p∗ = p̂.
14However, ﬁnding that k is at the minimum required by regulation is standard
in both static and dynamic models of banking; see, for example, Repullo and
Suarez (2004) and Repullo (2004).
15Notice that this is a simple special case of a beta distribution for which the
density function F ′(v) = ηvη−1 is decreasing in v, so small liquidity shocks are
more likely than large shocks.
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Going analytically beyond this point is, however, complicated,
because although the bank’s objective function (16) is concave in λ,
this is in general no longer the case once we substitute the constraint
k = κ(1 − λ) into (16), since this function is convex in k. For this
reason, our results on equilibrium liquidity and capital will be derived
from numerical solutions.
2.2 Equilibrium without an LLR
We now compare the equilibrium behavior of the bank when there
is an LLR with its behavior when there is no LLR. The objective
function of the bank in such a model is a special case of (11) when
we set v0 = v1 = 0 (i.e., no last-resort lending), which gives
UB = pF
(
λ
1− k
)
[(1− λ)(R(p)− 1) + k]− (1 + δ)k.
Thus, the bank gets (1− λ)(R(p) − 1) + k in the high-return state,
which obtains with probability p, but only if it has suﬃcient liquidity
to cover the deposit withdrawals at date 1—that is, if v(1− k) ≤ λ,
an event that happens with probability F (λ/(1− k)).
From here we can follow our previous steps to conclude that when
the bank’s capital k is at the corner κ(1 − λ∗), its choice of risk is
characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition (15), so we get exactly the
same p∗ as in the model with the LLR. In other words, contrary to
what has been taken for granted in the banking literature, our model
predicts that the existence of an LLR does not have any eﬀect on
the bank’s incentives to take risk.
Computation of the eﬀects of having an LLR on the liquidity
decision of the bank requires us to specify the functional forms of
the high return of the risky asset, R(p), and the cumulative distribu-
tion function of the liquidity shock, F (v), as well as the parameter
values of the capital requirement κ, the cost of capital δ, the infor-
mativeness of the supervisory signal q, and the social cost of bank
failure c. Since our focus is on qualitative results, we will not cal-
ibrate the model to obtain plausible numerical results, but instead
choose simple functional forms and parameter values. Speciﬁcally,
the functional forms R(p) = 3 − 2p2 and F (v) = vη, with η = 0.25,
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Table 1. Equilibria with and without an LLR
With LLR Without LLR
λ∗ 0.11 0.23
k∗ 0.09 0.08
p∗ 0.59 0.59
v∗0 0.10 −
v∗1 0.22 −
will be maintained in all our simulations,16 and our baseline param-
eter values are L = 0.50, κ = δ = c = 0.10, and q = 0.60.
The corresponding equilibria with and without an LLR are shown
in table 1. As noted above, the level of risk p∗ chosen by the bank
is the same in both models, and may be obtained by substituting
R(p) = 3 − 2p2 into (15), which gives p∗ = √(2 + κ)/6 = 0.59. Not
surprisingly, the results in table 1 show that the liquidity buﬀer λ∗ is
much larger in the absence of an LLR.17 Given that k∗ = κ(1− λ∗),
this in turn implies a lower level of capital.
When the deposit withdrawal v(1−k∗) is below the bank’s liquid-
ity λ∗ (an event that happens with probability 0.58 in the model with
the LLR, and with probability 0.71 in the model without it), the bank
will be able to repay the depositors by selling the required amount
of the safe asset. Moreover, in the ﬁrst model, when v(1− k∗) > λ∗,
the LLR will provide liquidity up to v∗0 = 0.10 when it observes the
bad signal s0, and up to v∗1 = 0.22 when it observes the good signal
s1.
The probability that the bank gets a positive payoﬀ in the model
with an LLR is
p∗
[
(1− q)F
(
v∗0 + λ
∗
1− k∗
)
+ qF
(
v∗1 + λ
∗
1− k∗
)]
= 0.44,
16Observe that R(p) = 3 − 2p2 is decreasing and concave, with R(1) = 1 and
R(1) + R′(1) = −3 < 0, so assumption 1 is satisﬁed. Also, the median liquidity
shock is F−1(0.5) = 0.0625.
17Gonzalez-Eiras (2003) provides some interesting empirical evidence on this
result. He shows that the contingent credit line agreement signed by the Cen-
tral Bank of Argentina with a group of international banks in December 1996
enhanced that central bank’s ability to act as an LLR and led to a signiﬁcant
decrease in the liquidity holdings of domestic Argentinian banks.
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while the corresponding probability in the model without an LLR is
p∗F
(
λ∗
1− k∗
)
= 0.42.
Since in the ﬁrst model the bank is investing a higher proportion
of its portfolio in the risky asset, its equilibrium expected payoﬀ is
signiﬁcantly higher with an LLR (0.45 against 0.37).
2.3 Comparative Statics
We next analyze the eﬀect on the equilibrium of the game between
the bank and the LLR of changes in the capital requirement κ, the
cost of capital δ, the informativeness of the supervisory signal q, and
the social cost of bank failure c. The results summarized in table 2 are
derived by computing the equilibrium corresponding to deviations in
κ, δ, q, and c from the baseline case.
As noted above, an increase in the capital requirement κ leads
to an increase in p∗, which by (13) increases the maximum support
provided by the LLR contingent on the bad and the good signal,
v∗0 and v∗1. The eﬀect on λ
∗ is also positive. Two reasons explain
this result. First, the higher capital requirement makes investment
in the risky asset, which does not carry a capital charge, relatively
less attractive for the bank than investing in the safe asset. Second,
the higher p∗ reduces the success payoﬀ of the risky asset, R(p∗),
and also makes it relatively less attractive for the bank than the safe
Table 2. Equilibrium Eﬀects of Changes in the Capital
Requirement κ, the Cost of Capital δ, the Informa-
tiveness of the Supervisory Signal q, and the Social Cost
of Bank Failure c
x
dp∗
dx
dλ∗
dx
dk∗
dx
dv∗0
dx
dv∗1
dx
κ + + + + +
δ 0 + − 0 0
q 0 − + − +
c 0 − + + +
Vol. 1 No. 2 Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the LLR 65
asset. On the other hand, the higher liquidity support oﬀered by the
LLR reduces the bank’s incentives to invest in the safe asset, but
the numerical results show that this eﬀect is dominated by the other
two.
With regard to the other comparative statics results, note ﬁrst
that, as shown analytically, the value of p∗ chosen by the bank only
depends on the capital requirement κ, so the eﬀect of the other three
parameters is zero.
Since the cost of capital δ does not aﬀect p∗, it does not have
any eﬀect either on the maximum liquidity support provided by the
LLR contingent on the bad and the good signal, v∗0 and v∗1. The cost
of capital δ has a positive eﬀect on equilibrium liquidity λ∗, because
when capital is more expensive, investing in the safe asset (which
does not carry a capital charge) is relatively more attractive than
investing in the risky asset. Since k∗ = κ(1− λ∗), this also explains
why an increase in δ has a negative eﬀect on k∗.
As noted in section 1, the critical value v∗0 is decreasing in the
quality q of the supervisory information, while the critical value v∗1
is increasing in q, so with better information the bank is less (more)
likely to be supported by the LLR when the signal is bad (good).
The sign of the derivative of λ∗ with respect to q is negative, which
means that the positive eﬀect of having less support when the signal
is bad is dominated by the negative eﬀect of having more support
when the signal is good. Since k∗ = κ(1− λ∗), this in turn explains
why an increase in q has a positive eﬀect on k∗. However, when q
is suﬃciently large, we may get to the corner λ∗ = 0 and k∗ = κ,
where these derivatives become zero.
As also noted in section 1, the critical values v∗0 and v∗1 are in-
creasing in the social cost of bank failure c, because when this cost is
high, the LLR has a stronger incentive to lend to the bank in order
to save c when the higher return state obtains. This explains why
the bank wants to hold a lower liquidity buﬀer λ∗, so k∗ = κ(1−λ∗)
will be higher. However, as in the case of parameter q, when c is suf-
ﬁciently large, we may get to the corner λ∗ = 0 and k∗ = κ, where
these derivatives become zero.
If we consider that the social cost of failure increases more than
proportionately with the size of the bank’s balance sheet (which we
have normalized to one), c will be higher for large banks, which
implies a “too big to fail” result: large banks are more likely to
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be supported by the LLR, and consequently they will hold smaller
liquidity buﬀers.
3. Extensions
3.1 Penalty Rates
The classical doctrine on the LLR put forward by Bagehot (1873)
required “that these loans should only be made at a very high rate of
interest.” We now examine how the results in section 2 are modiﬁed
when the LLR charges a penalty rate r > 0. Importantly, we assume
that r is exogenously given ex-ante, and not chosen by the LLR
ex-post.
To characterize the equilibrium of the new game between the
bank and the LLR, suppose that v(1− k) deposits are withdrawn at
date 1. If v(1− k) ≤ λ, the bank can repay the depositors by selling
the required amount of the safe asset, so there is no change with
respect to our previous analysis. If, on the other hand, v(1 − k) >
λ, the bank needs to borrow v(1 − k) − λ from the LLR. If such
funding is obtained, the bank’s payoﬀ in the high-return state equals
the return of its investment in the risky asset, (1−λ)R(p), minus the
amount paid to the remaining depositors, (1− v)(1− k), minus the
amount paid to the LLR, (1 + r)[v(1− k)− λ], that is,
(1− λ)R(p)− (1− v)(1− k)− (1 + r)[v(1− k)− λ]
= (1− λ)[R(p)− 1] + k − r[v(1− k)− λ].
The last term in this expression accounts for the interest payments
to the LLR.
The decision of the LLR in the case when v(1 − k) > λ is now
characterized as follows. If the LLR observes signal s and decides
to support the bank, with probability Pr(R1 | s) the bank will be
solvent at date 2 and the LLR will recover its loan v(1 − k) − λ
and net r[v(1− k)− λ] in interest payments, while with probability
Pr(R0 | s) the bank will fail and the LLR will lose v(1− k)− λ and
incur the cost c, so the LLR’s expected payoﬀ is
r[v(1− k)− λ] Pr(R1 | s)− [v(1− k)− λ + c] Pr(R0 | s).
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On the other hand, if the LLR does not provide the liquidity support,
the bank will be liquidated at date 1, and the LLR’s payoﬀ will
be −c. Hence the LLR will support the bank if
r[v(1− k)− λ] Pr(R1 | s)− [v(1− k)− λ + c] Pr(R0 | s) ≥ −c.
Substituting (3) and (4) into this expression, it follows that when
the LLR observes the bad signal s0, it will support the bank if the
liquidity shortfall, v(1−k)−λ, is smaller than or equal to the critical
value
v0 ≡ cPr(R1 | s0)Pr(R0 | s0)− rPr(R1 | s0) =
cp(1− q)
(1− p)q − rp(1− q) ,
and when the LLR observes the good signal s1, it will support the
bank if the liquidity shortfall, v(1− k)− λ, is smaller than or equal
to the critical value
v1 ≡ cPr(R1 | s1)Pr(R0 | s1)− rPr(R1 | s1) =
cpq
(1− p)(1− q)− rpq .
As before, it is easy to check that v1 > v0 whenever q > 12 . Also,
notice that both v0 and v1 are increasing in r, so with penalty rates
the LLR will be softer with the bank, providing emergency funding
for a larger range of liquidity shocks.
To compute the bank’s new objective function, we have to sub-
tract from UB in (11) the expected interest payments to the LLR. If
the LLR observes the bad signal s0, the bank borrows from the LLR
when 0 < v(1− k)− λ ≤ v0, that is, when
λ
1− k < v ≤
v0 + λ
1− k ,
so the conditional expected cost of this borrowing is
r
[∫ v0+λ
1−k
λ
1−k
[v(1− k)− λ] dF (v)
]
Pr(s0 | R1).
Similarly, if the LLR observes the good signal s1, the conditional
expected cost of the bank’s borrowing is
r
[∫ v1+λ
1−k
λ
1−k
[v(1− k)− λ] dF (v)
]
Pr(s1 | R1).
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Hence the bank’s new objective function is
UB = p
[
(1− q)F
(
v0 + λ
1− k
)
+ qF
(
v1 + λ
1− k
)]
× [(1− λ)(R(p)− 1) + k]− (1 + δ)k
− rp
[
(1− q)
∫ v0+λ
1−k
λ
1−k
[v(1− k)− λ] dF (v)
+ q
∫ v1+λ
1−k
λ
1−k
[v(1− k)− λ] dF (v)
]
.
Assuming that F (v) = vη, the integrals in this expression can be
easily solved, and we can compute for the baseline parameters the
equilibrium eﬀects of charging a penalty rate r.18 The results are
presented in table 3.
Thus, an increase in the penalty rate r leads to a reduction in
p∗, so the bank’s portfolio becomes riskier. The reason for this result
is that penalty rates increase the expected interest payments in the
high-return state and, consequently, the bank tries to compensate
this eﬀect by choosing a higher risk and higher return portfolio (recall
that by assumption 1, a decrease in p increases R(p)). The reduction
in p∗ would ceteris paribus lead to a decrease in both v∗0 and v∗1, but
this is more than compensated by the positive eﬀect of the interest
payments on the LLR’s willingness to lend. The increase in v∗0 and
v∗1 in turn explains why the bank chooses a lower liquidity buﬀer λ
∗,
so k∗ = κ(1− λ∗) will be higher.
Table 3. Equilibrium Eﬀects of Changes in the
Penalty Rate r
x
dp∗
dx
dλ∗
dx
dk∗
dx
dv∗0
dx
dv∗1
dx
r − − + + +
18It should be noted that this computation is complicated because now p∗
depends on r, and cannot be directly solved from the ﬁrst-order condition (15).
The equilibrium is obtained by numerical iteration of the best response functions
of the two players.
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3.2 Collateralized Lending
The classical doctrine on the LLR put forward by Bagehot (1873)
not only required charging “a very high rate of interest,” but also
“that at this rate these advances should be made on all good banking
securities.” We now examine how the results in section 2 are modi-
ﬁed when last-resort lending is collateralized, so the LLR becomes a
senior claimant when it provides the liquidity support and the bank
subsequently fails.19 Obviously, for this to make any diﬀerence the
failure return should be positive, so in this subsection we assume
that R0 = l ∈ (0, L).20
To analyze the eﬀect of this change, consider a situation in which
v(1−k) > λ, and let s be the signal observed by the LLR. There are
two cases to consider. First, if the liquidity shortfall, v(1− k)− λ, is
smaller than or equal to the collateral l, the LLR is fully covered, so
its expected payoﬀ if it supports the bank, −cPr(R0 | s), is greater
than the payoﬀ if it does not, −c, so the bank will always be sup-
ported. Second, if the liquidity shortfall, v(1−k)−λ, is greater than
the collateral l, the expected payoﬀ of the LLR if it supports the
bank is
− [v(1− k)− λ− l + c] Pr(R0 | s),
since with probability Pr(R0 | s) the bank will fail at date 2 and the
LLR will lose v(1 − k) − λ − l and incur the cost c. On the other
hand, if the LLR does not provide the liquidity support, the bank
will be liquidated at date 1, and the LLR’s payoﬀ will be −c. Hence
the LLR will support the bank if
− [v(1− k)− λ− l + c] Pr(R0 | s) ≥ −c.
19The referee criticized this interpretation, noting that “if we follow Bagehot’s
second rule and only provide liquidity backed by ‘good banking securities,’ it
is not clear why the central bank will end up underwriting risky investments.”
In the referee’s view, in the present model, “a fairer interpretation of Bagehot
might imply no lending by the central bank at all.” However, as noted by Good-
hart (1999, 343), “Bagehot’s proposal related simply to the collateral that the
applicant could oﬀer, and the eﬀect of this rule in practice was to distinguish, in
part, between those loans on which the central bank might expect with some con-
siderable probability to make a loss and those on which little, or no, loss should
eventuate.”
20The assumption that the failure return l at date 2 is smaller than the liqui-
dation value L at date 1 is not required for our analysis, but makes a lot of sense
in the context of the model.
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Table 4. Equilibrium Eﬀects of Collateralization
x
dp∗
dx
dλ∗
dx
dk∗
dx
d(v∗0 + l)
dx
d(v∗1 + l)
dx
l 0 − + 1 1
Substituting (3) and (4) into this expression, it follows that when
the LLR observes the bad signal s0, it will support the bank if the
liquidity shortfall, v(1−k)−λ, is smaller than or equal to the critical
value v0 + l, where v0 is given by (5); when the LLR observes the
good signal s1, it will support the bank if the liquidity shortfall,
v(1 − k) − λ, is smaller than or equal to the critical value v1 + l,
where v1 is given by (6).
Hence the bank’s objective function becomes
UB = p
[
(1− q)F
(
v0 + l + λ
1− k
)
+ qF
(
v1 + l + λ
1− k
)]
× [(1− λ)(R(p)− 1) + k]− (1 + δ)k.
Using the same arguments as in section 2, it follows that the bank’s
choice of risk p∗ will also be characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
(15), so it only depends on the capital requirement κ.
As for the eﬀect of collateralization on the bank’s liquidity and
capital decisions, note that the case in which the LLR’s loan is not
collateralized (and it is junior to the claim of the deposit insurer)
is equivalent to the case l = 0 analyzed in section 2, so the signs of
derivatives with respect to l in table 4 indicate the eﬀect of collater-
alization on λ∗ and k∗.
Thus, collateralization of last-resort lending does not have any
eﬀect on the bank’s incentives to take risk, but increases the maxi-
mum support that the LLR is willing to provide contingent on the
bad and the good signal, v∗0 + l and v∗1 + l. This explains why the
bank wants to hold a lower liquidity buﬀer λ∗, so k∗ = κ(1−λ∗) will
be higher. In other words, the protection for the LLR advocated by
Bagehot translates into a lower liquidity buﬀer and hence a higher
probability that the bank will require emergency liquidity assistance,
but without any eﬀect on risk taking.
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3.3 Discounting of Future Payoﬀs
The LLR is a public institution that is run by oﬃcials that may have
ﬁxed terms of oﬃce. If these terms are short or the oﬃcials are close
to ﬁnishing their terms, the oﬃcials may have an incentive to avoid
current costs possibly at the expense of some larger future costs that
would be assumed by their successors. Formally, we can incorporate
this possibility into our model by introducing a discount factor β < 1
for the LLR.21
To analyze the eﬀect of such discounting, consider a situation in
which v(1 − k) > λ, and let s be the signal observed by the LLR.
The expected discounted payoﬀ of the LLR if it supports the bank
is now
−β [v(1− k)− λ + c] Pr(R0 | s),
since with probability Pr(R0 | s) the bank will fail at date 2 and
the LLR will lose v(1 − k) − λ and incur the cost c. On the other
hand, if the LLR does not provide the liquidity support, the bank
will be liquidated at date 1, and the LLR’s payoﬀ will be −c. Hence
the LLR will support the bank if
−β [v(1− k)− λ + c] Pr(R0 | s) ≥ −c.
Substituting (3) and (4) into this expression, it follows that when
the LLR observes the bad signal s0, it will support the bank if the
liquidity shortfall, v(1−k)−λ, is smaller than or equal to the critical
value
v0 ≡ c[1− β Pr(R0 | s0)]
β Pr(R0 | s0) =
c[p(1− q) + (1− β)(1− p)q]
β(1− p)q ,
and when the LLR observes the good signal s1, it will support the
bank if the liquidity shortfall, v(1− k)− λ, is smaller than or equal
to the critical value
v1 ≡ c[1− β Pr(R0 | s1)]
β Pr(R0 | s1) =
c[pq + (1− β)(1− p)(1− q)]
β(1− p)(1− q) .
21This assumption is justiﬁed by Kaufman (1991) in the following terms: “The
discount rate used by policy makers, who are under considerable political pressure
to optimize economic performance in the short-term and whose terms of oﬃce
are relatively short and not guaranteed to last until the next crisis, is likely to be
overestimated.”
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Table 5. Equilibrium Eﬀects of Changes in the LLR’s
Discount Factor β
x
dp∗
dx
dλ∗
dx
dk∗
dx
dv∗0
dx
dv∗1
dx
β 0 + − − −
As before, it is easy to check that v1 > v0 whenever q > 12 . Also,
notice that both v0 and v1 are decreasing in the discount factor β.
This means that an LLR with β < 1 will be softer with the bank,
providing funding for a larger range of liquidity shocks.
We can now compute for the baseline parameters the equilibrium
eﬀects of introducing a discount factor β < 1 for the LLR. As in the
model in section 2, the bank’s choice of risk p∗ is again character-
ized by the ﬁrst-order condition (15), so the discount factor β does
not have any eﬀect on the bank’s incentives to take risk. The full
comparative statics results are presented in table 5.
As expected, an increase in the discount factor β (that is, a de-
crease in the corresponding discount rate) makes the LLR more will-
ing to incur the current costs of not supporting the bank in order
to save some larger future costs, so the derivative of v∗0 and v∗1 with
respect to β is negative. The reduction in v∗0 and v∗1 in turn explains
why the bank chooses a higher liquidity buﬀer λ∗, so k∗ = κ(1− λ∗)
will be lower.
Thus we conclude that a high LLR discount rate leads to for-
bearance, but in line with our previous results, this only translates
into a lower liquidity buﬀer, without any eﬀect on risk taking.
3.4 Internalizing Deposit Insurance Payouts
We have assumed so far that the LLR is institutionally separated
from the deposit insurer, so the former does not take into account
deposit insurance payouts in deciding whether to support the bank.
We now consider a situation in which the LLR either internalizes or
assumes a fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] of these payouts. When γ = 0, the LLR
is completely independent from the deposit insurer (e.g., a central
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bank with no deposit insurance role), whereas when γ = 1, the LLR
also acts as deposit insurer.22
To analyze the eﬀect of such possible connection between the LLR
and the deposit insurer, consider a situation in which v(1− k) > λ,
and let s be the signal observed by the LLR. The expected payoﬀ of
the LLR if it supports the bank is now
−[v(1− k)− λ + c + γ(1− v)(1− k)] Pr(R0 | s),
since with probability Pr(R0 | s) the bank will fail at date 2 and the
LLR will lose v(1− k)− λ, incur the cost c, and assume a fraction γ
of the deposit insurance payouts that are given by (1−v)(1−k). On
the other hand, if the LLR does not provide the liquidity support,
the bank will be liquidated at date 1, and the LLR will incur the
cost c and assume a fraction γ of the deposit insurance payouts that
are given by (1−k)−λ− (1−λ)L, where (1−λ)L is the liquidation
value of the bank’s risky asset.23 Hence the LLR will support the
bank if
−[v(1− k)− λ + c + γ(1− v)(1− k)] Pr(R0 | s)
≥ −[c + γ[(1− k)− λ− (1− λ)L]].
Substituting (3) and (4) into this expression, it follows that when
the LLR observes the bad signal s0, it will support the bank if the
liquidity shortfall, v(1−k)−λ, is smaller than or equal to the critical
value
v0 ≡ [c + γ(1− k − λ)] Pr(R1 | s0)− γ(1− λ)L(1− γ) Pr(R0 | s0)
=
[c + γ(1− k − λ)] p(1− q)− γ(1− λ)L[p(1− q) + (1− p)q]
(1− γ)(1− p)q ,
22Intermediate cases are also relevant. For example, until 1998 the Bank of
Spain matched the contribution of the Spanish banks to the deposit insurance
fund, so γ was 1
2
.
23We are implicitly assuming that the amount of deposits is greater than or
equal to the liquidation value of the bank at date 1, that is, 1−k ≥ λ+(1−λ)L.
Notice that if k is at the corner κ(1 − λ), this condition reduces to (1 − λ)(1 −
κ−L) ≥ 0. In our numerical analysis we take κ = 0.10 and L = 0.50, so it holds.
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and when the LLR observes the good signal s1, it will support the
bank if the liquidity shortfall, v(1− k)− λ, is smaller than or equal
to the critical value
v1 ≡ [c + γ(1− k − λ)] Pr(R1 | s1)− γ(1− λ)L(1− γ) Pr(R0 | s1)
=
[c + γ(1− k − λ)] pq − γ(1− λ)L[pq + (1− p)(1− q)]
(1− γ)(1− p)(1− q) .
As before, one can check that v1 > v0 whenever q > 12 .
We can now compute for the baseline parameters the equilibrium
eﬀects of internalizing a fraction γ of the deposit insurance payouts.
As before, the bank’s choice of risk p∗ is again characterized by the
ﬁrst-order condition (15), so the share γ does not have any eﬀect
on the bank’s incentives to take risk. The full comparative statics
results are presented in table 6.
An increase in the share γ makes the LLR tougher when it ob-
serves the bad signal s0 (since the critical value v∗0 is decreasing in
γ), and makes it softer when it observes the good signal s1 (since
the critical value v∗1 is increasing in γ). The sign of the derivative of
λ∗ with respect to γ is negative for small values of γ, for which the
positive eﬀect of having less support when the signal is bad is domi-
nated by the negative eﬀect of having more support when the signal
is good. However, for suﬃciently high values of γ, the critical value
v∗1 reaches the value of 1, which means that the bank will always
be supported when the signal is good, and so the only remaining
eﬀect will be the positive one associated with further reductions in
v∗0. Since k∗ = κ(1− λ∗), this explains the two possible signs of the
eﬀect of γ on k∗.
Table 6. Equilibrium Eﬀects of Changes in the
LLR’s Share of Deposit Insurance Payouts γ
x
dp∗
dx
dλ∗
dx
dk∗
dx
dv∗0
dx
dv∗1
dx
γ 0 −/+ +/− − +
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4. Concluding Remarks
Goodhart (1999, 339–40) has argued that “there are few issues so
subject to myth, sometimes unhelpful myths that tend to obscure
rather than illuminate real issues, as is the subject of whether a
central bank . . . should act as a lender of last resort.” The third
myth in his list is that “moral hazard is everywhere and at all times a
major consideration.”24 This paper provides a rationale for the claim
that this is indeed a myth. Speciﬁcally, it shows that the existence
of a lender of last resort does not have any eﬀect on the risk of the
banks’ illiquid portfolios, but simply reduces their incentives to hold
liquid assets.
Although our model is special in a number of respects, we believe
that the results are fairly robust. In particular, neither full deposit
insurance nor the assumption that deposit withdrawals are purely
random is essential. To see this, suppose that in the context of our
basic model (without liquidity λ and capital k) there is an exoge-
nous fraction u ∈ (0, L] of junior uninsured deposits that require an
expected return equal to zero,25 and let d denote the corresponding
interest rate. We assume that uninsured depositors observe the same
signal s ∈ {s0, s1} as the LLR,26 and run on the bank at date 1 if
and only if they observe the bad signal s0.
In this situation, the LLR will support the bank if the withdrawal
u is smaller than the critical value v0 given by (5), so the bank’s
objective function (7) becomes
UB = p[(1− q)1(u ≤ v0) + q][R(p)− 1− ud],
where 1(u ≤ v0) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if
u ≤ v0, and 0 otherwise. From here it follows that the ﬁrst-order
condition that characterizes the equilibrium choice of risk p∗ is
R(p∗) + p∗R′(p∗) = 1 + ud∗, (17)
24The other myths are that it is generally possible to distinguish between illi-
quidity and insolvency, that national central bank LLR capabilities are unre-
stricted whereas international bodies cannot function as LLRs, and that it is
possible to dispense with an LLR altogether.
25The assumption that u ≤ L is made for simplicity, in order to ensure that
the junior uninsured depositors get zero when the bank is liquidated at date 1.
26This assumption is also made for simplicity. See Repullo (2005) for a model
where the depositors’ signal is diﬀerent (but coarser) than that of the LLR.
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where d∗ is the equilibrium deposit rate. Assuming that unin-
sured depositors can only claim at date 1 the principal (and not
the interest), they receive 1(u ≤ v∗0)u at date 1 with probability
Pr(s0) = q + (1 − 2q)p∗, and u(1 + d∗) at date 2 with probability
Pr(R1, s1) = qp∗. Hence their participation constraint is
[q + (1− 2q)p∗]1(u ≤ v∗0) + qp∗(1 + d∗) = 1. (18)
Solving equations (17) and (18) gives the equilibrium values of p∗
and d∗.27
On the other hand, in the absence of an LLR, the bank’s ob-
jective function becomes UB = pq[R(p) − 1 − ud], so the ﬁrst-order
condition (17) does not change, while the participation constraint
(18) simpliﬁes to qp∗(1 + d∗) = 1. Hence we conclude that when
u > v∗0 the existence of an LLR does not have any eﬀect on the
bank’s incentives to take risk. Moreover, when u ≤ v∗0, the existence
of an LLR reduces the deposit rate that satisﬁes the participation
constraint (18), which in turn, by the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argu-
ment noted in the introductory paragraphs of this paper, increases
the equilibrium value of p∗. Hence having an LLR may actually re-
duce the bank’s incentives to take risk.
The stark contrast between our results and the extant literature
deserves further discussion. It is true that in general any form of in-
surance (e.g., against liquidity shocks) has the potential to create a
moral hazard problem. In the context of our model, this clearly shows
in the eﬀect on the holding of liquid assets. But to have an eﬀect on
risk taking, something else is needed. One such case would be the
following. Suppose that instead of observing a signal s on the return
of the bank’s risky asset, the uninsured depositors observe the bank’s
choice of p. Furthermore, suppose that, in the absence of an LLR,
they can make the deposit rate d contingent on the choice of p (for ex-
ample, by threatening to withdraw their funds). In this case, the bank
would maximize UB = p[R(p)− 1− ud(p)] subject to the uninsured
depositors’ participation constraint p[1+ d(p)] = 1. Substituting the
constraint into the bank’s objective function and maximizing the
resulting expression with respect to p gives the ﬁrst-order condition
27Since the relationship between p∗ and d∗ in both the ﬁrst-order condition
(17) and the participation constraint (18) is decreasing, we may have multiple
equilibria, in which case we focus on the one that is closest to the ﬁrst-best
p̂—that is, the one with the highest p∗.
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R(p˜) + p˜R′(p˜) = 1− u. (19)
Since R(p) + pR′(p) is decreasing, the bank’s choice of risk p˜ is
increasing in the proportion u of uninsured deposits, and converges
to the ﬁrst-best p̂ when u tends to 1. So we conclude that the
existence of uninsured depositors that observe the bank’s choice
of risk and use this information to renegotiate the terms of their
contract ameliorates the bank’s risk-shifting incentives. Moreover,
the introduction of an LLR that facilitates the withdrawal of the
funds at date 1 may upset this disciplining mechanism, bringing us
back to the p∗ < p˜ characterized above.
Two objections can be made to this argument. The standard one
is that small depositors do not have the ability or the incentives to
monitor banks.28 The nonstandard one that we are putting forward
here is that one should distinguish between the monitoring of actions
and the monitoring of the consequences of those actions.29 In the ab-
sence of an LLR, the former ameliorates the moral hazard problem,
but the latter does not, because it simply changes the bank’s objec-
tive function from p[R(p) − 1 − ud] to pq[R(p) − 1 − ud]. Clearly,
multiplying the function by a constant does not have any eﬀect on
the ﬁrst-order condition that characterizes the bank’s choice of risk.
And the same result obtains when there is an LLR. Since arguably
the second is the most plausible type of monitoring,30 we conclude
that there should be no presumption that the existence of an LLR
worsens the bank’s risk-shifting incentives—except, as shown in sec-
tion 3.1, when it charges penalty rates.
Finally, it is worth noting that our model also provides a ra-
tionale for a standard feature of LLR policy, namely the principle
of “constructive ambiguity.” This is taken to mean that LLRs do
not typically spell out beforehand the procedural and practical de-
tails of their policy. One possible rationalization of this principle is
based on the idea of the LLR committing to a mixed strategy; see
28As forcefully argued by Corrigan (1991, 49–50), “I think it is sheer fantasy
to assume that individual investors and depositors—and perhaps even large and
relatively sophisticated investors and depositors—can make truly informed credit
judgements about highly complex ﬁnancial instruments and institutions.”
29See Prat (2003) for a detailed discussion of the related distinction between
signals on actions and signals on the consequences of actions.
30This is, for example, the assumption made in the recent work of Rochet and
Vives (2004) on the LLR.
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Freixas (1999). Our model supports a diﬀerent story, suggested by
Goodfriend and Lacker (1999), according to which the policy is not
random from the perspective of the LLR, but it is perceived as such
by outsiders that cannot observe the supervisory information on the
basis of which decisions are made. Thus, the randomness lies in the
supervisory information, not in the policy rule.
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